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III.WestAfrica
The sub-region witaessed ups and downs on the political front. General élections were held
successfully in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Niger, in addition to local élections in Mali,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Cape Verde. On the negative side, there were rwo alleged coup
attempts in Mauritania, a military mutiny in Guinea-Bissau and the occasional arrest of
Opposition leaders in Mauritania and Guinea. Political stalemate continued in Togo. The
' violence in Côte d'Ivoire, however, continued to be West Africa's biggest headache, with
former Liberian rebels intervening in the conflict, persisting political tension between Côte
d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and economie dislocation from migrants fleeing from the war-
torn country. Incidental benefits from trade diversion and capital flight to other West African
/ Countries hardly compensated for this situation. Violent exchanges between the Ivorian
^ srmy and French peacekeepers led to a massive exodus of Europeans and the thorough
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isolation of the Ivorian government. Pohtical instability by and large lessened in the forest
région of the southwest, as Sierra Leone struggled to come to terms with its post-conflict
situation, while Guinea-Bissau and Liberia continued their transition to normal civilian rule.
Guinea witnessed, as a result of economie crisis and cross-border ties with Liberia, several
violent uprisings, but with both government and the various opposition groups pullmg back
from the brink at the last moment. Partly as a result of the return to some degree of normality
in Guinea-Bissau, the conflict in Senegal's Casamance région lost most of its intensity, lead-
ing to a peace agreement between the government and the secessionist movement in
December. Violence in various forms (communal, criminal or involving militias) contin-
ued to characterise Nigérian politics and society, without apparent risk of complete state dis-
integration. Some Sahelian countries were troubled by the activity of the Àlgerian-based
'Groupement Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat' (GSPC), in addition to highway
banditry and, in Niger, some rebellious actions by Tuaregs. GSPC activity encouraged fur-
ther military intervention by the US in a range of countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger as well
as Chad), in the form of US military aid and training for these countries' armed forces.
Finally, West Africa's économies were impacted by high oil priées and locust plagues in the
Sahel. Growth rates ranged from a low 2.6% in Guinea to a high 6.5% in Burkina Faso, but
in most cases this was not enough to offset the effects of high petrol priées or to keep pace
with population growth.
Electoral Politics,Transitions andThreats of Coups
General élections took place in three countries, with stabilising effects for the pohtical sys-
tem in two of them, Ghana and Niger. The électoral contest in Ghana (7 December), while
leading to victory for the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the re-election of its
leader, President Kufuor, was fairly balanced in its outcome. The main opposition party, the
National Democratie Congress, won 94 seats in parliament against the NPP 's 128, thus fur-
ther consolidating a two-party system. Niger, too, maintained a degree of political (but not
social) stability, with the successful staging of municipal as well as presidential and par-
liamentary élections. These were marked neither by the chaos of the previous élections nor
by a serious détérioration of relations within the political class, such as the country expe-
rienced during the 1990s. In fact, the victory of incumbent President Tandja in two rounds
(16 November and 4 December) represented the first renewal of government by truly demo-
cratie means in the country's post-colonial history. The success of législative élections in
Guinea-Bissau proved more contentious. As the first step in a two-year transition process
following a bloodless coup on 14 September 2003, the parliamentary élections (28-30
March) saw some disturbances at polling stations and the contestation of the results by
the second biggest of Guinea-Bissau's three main political parties. However, an ECOWAS
délégation gave its approval to the way the polls were conducted and, after its intercession,
all parties agreed to respect the outcome.
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Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone held local élections, in the last case as part
of the transition process that began after the return, under UN administration, of peace in
2002. These polls proceeded peacerully, except in Nigeria, where local élections had to be
postponed in some states because of strife and violence. Generally, these élections, which
completed the élection marathon begun in 2003, were marked by low turnouts, violence and
fraud. While they confirmed the dominant position of President Obasanjo's People's
Democratie Party, the legal battle over the outcome of the 2003 presidential contest con-
tinued throughout the year, with his challenger vainly asking for an annulment on the basis
of vote rigging. Other countries in the sub-region went through post-électoral periods
(Mauritama, Guinea) or faced the typical issues of a run-up to électoral contests (scheduled
for 2005 or later), such as the revision of électoral codes (Burkina, as in Niger) or voter reg-
isters (Benin, but also Ghana) and the realignment of opposition parties (Gambia). Cabinet
reshuffles, some of them more eventfol than others, took place in Guinea, Mauritania,
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Sierra Leone, while the governments of Burkina and Togo suc-
cessfiilly played on divisions within the opposition. In the latter country, spéculation
about the presidential succession was encouraged by rumours of the ill health of the head
of state, President Eyadéma, West Africa's longest incumbent ruler. However, similar con-
cerns ceased to be an issue in Guinea, where the health of President Lansana Conté
appeared to have stabilised.
As in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, politics in Togo could be said to be marked by
some sort of transition process as the European Union negotiated a roadmap for démocra-
tisation with the government as a precondition for the resumption of aid, though with lit-
tle sign of a genuine breakthrough by the end of the year. Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire also
, continued to be governed under transitional arrangements ahead of planned élections in
2005. In Liberia, this involved the inclusion - as a result of the peace agreement that osten-
sibly ended the civil war in 2003 - of members of all warring factions in the cabinet and
ministries, leading to genera! dysfunction in government and the nomination of some 40
presidential contenders for the 2005 élections. Similar steps proved impossible in Côte
d'Ivoire as a resuit of complete lack of agreement between the government of President
Laurent Gbagbo and allied groups on the one hand and rebel groups in the north and west
on the other over disarmament, reconquest by thé government of national territory and con-
stitutional reform that would enable Gbagbo's main rival, Alassane Ouattara, to stand for
président.
Mauritania saw thé partial renewal of its senate (9 April) through élections, but without
discernible benefit for the political stability of the country. Twice the government
/ announced it had foiled coup attempts (9 August and 28 September), claiming on the first
occasion that the instigators were Mauritanian army officers based in Burkina Faso and, on
* thé-second, blaming thé alleged ringleader of a failed coup attempt in 2003. Army officers
*•." were arrested, as were thé members of opposition parties who were accused of collusion,
\ leading to a mass trial of those accused of plotting the overthrow of the government. In
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Guinea, opposition leaders were similarly arrested on a coup charge, followed by their
release without further legal steps. No such events took place in other countries in thé sub-
region, although Guinea-Bissau witnessed a military mutiny leading to thé assassination
of thé joint chief of staff (6 October) and what was seen as thé government's capitulation
to thé mutineers' demands on a range of corporate issues. Burkina Faso saw the conviction
of ringleaders accused of a coup attempt thé previous year.
Violence, Conflicts and Security
Nigeria, rather than better publicised Côte d'Ivoire, was the sub-region's most violent coun-
try. Communal conflicts, fed by disputes over land and grazing rights and by ethnie and reli-
gious divisions, continued to fray the fabric of this complex, multicultural society,
precariously held together by the centralising forces of the Nigérian fédération, i.e., the
armed forces and the distributive mechanisms for the country's expanding oil revenues. In
addition to communal conflicts, the country was again struck by violent acts of armed mih-
tias, especially in the southeast. These began either as movements claiming to défend the
birthright of an ethnie group - usually by demanding a bigger share of oil revenues and/or
an end to oil pollution - or as vigilante groups fighting the combined effects of crime and
inefficiënt policing. However, in recent years they have themselves degenerated mto crim-
inalised gangs, headed by véritable warlords trying to carve out personal empires. This
development in turn has led to fighting among rival militia groups, in addition to their prey-
ing on civil society. These activities, together with high levels of gang violence and the vio-
lent practices of secret cults in the south, coastal piracy targeting the oil industry, highway
banditry and, in the northeast, attacks by members of an Islamic sect, have contributed to
the genera! banality of violence, with violence being used as an instrument to settle scores
or 'résolve' conflicts. In this context, both police and the armed forces managed to main-
tain law and order only by employing the most brutal force themselves.
Thus, between February and July, Plateau State was struck by massive violence between
farmers and nomads and, especially, between Muslims and Christians, which spilled over
into the northem city of Kano, leading to the deaths of hundreds of people, the création of
tens of thousands of refugees and the déclaration of a state of emergency in the state. In
Adamawa State, similar clashes took place, leading to the displacement of 4,000 people.
Nationwide, the fédéral authonties registered some 800,000 internally displaced persons.
Combined gang, militia and state violence in the oil-producing areas of the southeast had
by mid-September claimed the lives of some 500 people. The maintenance of law and order
took a heavy toll on the country's poorly paid, corrupt and inefficiënt police force, which
itself allegedly killed more than 400 armed robbers between January and April alone.
However, few if any manifestations of violence in West Africa's most populous state spilled
over into neighbouring countries. Since they did not have sub-regional implications, they
did not attract much international attention.
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Conversely, the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire and the reluctance of its southern political class
and northern-based rebel forces to fully implement the Linas-Marcoussis agreement of
2003 continued to draw in neighbouring, sub-regional and international actors (see below).
While the rebel forces of the northern 'Forces nouvelles' were afFected by a violent lead-
ership conflict, the government of national reconciliation, which had come into being as a
result of Linas-Marcoussis, failed to fonction as a result of a power struggle between
President Laurent Gbagbo and (rebel représentative) Prime Minister Seydou Diarra. In
addition, the refusai of the rebels to disarm without a constitutional reform that would allow
Ouattara's presidential candidacy, the désire by southern politicians to reconquer the north
by violent means, the interférence by armed militias in Abidjan, obstructiveness by the
National Assembly and boycotts of government meetings by parties of the opposition made
for complete political deadlock.
The first major crisis erupted on 25-26 March, when a démonstration by opposition
parties was violently repressed by government forces and its allied militias, resulting in
120 fatalities, 274 people wounded and 20 disappearances, according to UNCHR estimâtes.
This appalling government act was surpassed only by the décision of government forces
to go on the offensive against the rebels in November. In the course of its attacks, French
troops, interposed between government and rebel forces, came under fire from government
planes, leading to several casualties. In reprisai, the French destroyed the entire - a couple
of fighters plus helicopters - Ivorian air force, which led to a massive witch-hunt against
French and white people generally by militias in Abidjan, which invaded homes, destroyed
and looted property and raped several women. As a result, most French citizens (9,000, the
largest French community in sub-Saharan Africa) were evacuated to Europe and Western
embassies closed, leaving only l ,000 white people behind and an Ivorian leadership at rock
bottom as a result of international censure and isolation.
By contrast, the sub-region's biggest meddler, Burkina Faso's President Biaise
Compaoré, again remained untouched, despite his record of subversive support for rebel-
lions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. He even improved his diplomatic position
(with Paris, if not others) by hosting the lOth Francophone summit (26-27 November).
While no violence, save that resulting from the rising crime rate, was recorded in
Sierra Leone, unemployment among young ex-combatants remained a potential security
threat. On the whole, however, the political process continued on its logical non-violent,
post-peace agreement course. In Liberia, UN peacekeepers finalised the disarmament
process of the former warring factions, although they were unable to prevent the sale of
heavy weapons to parties in neighbouring countries, notably Côte d'Ivoire. Several hun-
dreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees continued to live in camps,
waiting to return to their homes. While the training of a new Liberian police force was one
ferther step in the transition to normal civilian government, évidence of mounting corruption
ichthe political class did not point to a fondamental departure from past practice. Guinea,
besides witnessing various populär uprisings in protest against rapidly deteriorating living
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conditions, was confronted with a sudden rise of youth gangs and militias in the capital.
Potentially the most dangerous incidents from a sub-regional perspective, however, took
place in the southeastern forest région, around the town of N'Zérékoré (17 June), where
local ethnie communities with cross-border ties with kindred groups in Liberia engaged m
fighting. This was halted by Guinean security forces, which arrested large numbers of peo-
ple, including Liberian ex-combatants. The long-standing secessionist conflict m the
Casamance area of southern Senegal came to a possible end with the signmg of a peace
agreement on 30 December between the Senegalese government and rebels of the MFDC
('Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance'), though not without some lead-
ers of the movement distancing themselves from the deal. It was unclear whether local lead-
ers of thé MFDC, an extremely fragmented organisation, would support thé agreement. Its
true significance, therefore, remained unclear, although diminished support for thé MFDC
in Gumea-Bissau, itself halfway along an uncertain transition process marked by an unruly
military, helped towards reducing thé importance of this conflict.
Finally, thé Sahelian countnes, were faced with some GSPC cross-border activity. In
terras of the frequency and intensity of the violent exchanges between GSPC fighters and
thé government forces of Mali, Niger and Chad, this was a conflict of marginal importance
However, because the Islamic fundamentalist agenda of thé GSPC drew in thé US, thèse
conflicts developed a broader significance. US training of thé Mauritanian, Malian,
Nigérien and Chadian armies in counter-insurgency techniques and thé provision of mili-
tary matériel (ail-terrain vehicles, désert warfare equipment) had the potential not only of
raising the military capabilities of thé region's national armies but also, as part of the same
process, of militarising relations between states and non-state actors. Banditry in north-
ern Mali and Niger proved ominous in this respect, especially in Niger, where it might be
related to thé dissatisfaction of some Tuaregs with their share in thé country's pohtical
System.
Human Rights and thé Rule of Law
In several countnes, members of thé private media were harassed. Even in Senegal, which
markedly improved its stance on human nghts by abolishing thé death penalty, thé editor
of a newspaper writing about alleged corruption in thé customs service and judiciary was
arrested on charges of Publishing confidential, false and politically sensitive information.
The editor was released after a couple of weeks in j ail, but his arrest led to a one-day stnke
by private newspapers (12 July). Although thé Senegalese media continued to enjoy com-
parative press freedom, this case somewhat detracted from thé human rights award pre-
sented by an American NGO to President Abdoulaye Wade for his former rôle as an
opposition politician and his médiation of régional conflicts. The situation was much worse,
however, m Gambia, where an editor was assassinated (16 December) after cnticising a
draconian new press law. Though thé government condemned thé murder and denied a Imk
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between it and tighter media régulations, journalists staged a one-week protest strike. A for-
eign journalist in Côte d'Ivoire was probably murdered after his disappearance on 16
April, this event following the murder of a French journalist the previous year. Similarly,
in Togo an editor received death threats after publishing articles on an exiled opposition
group and on Eyadéma's possible retirement—in spite of the introduction of a more liberal
press code. In Burkina on 13 December thousands of people demonstrated as they had done
every year, to protest the murder of a well-known journalist in 1998. The case, in which the
president's brother and presidential guards were suspected of being implicated, again failed
to come to trial. Less serious forms of harassment took place in Niger and Benin. Finally,
in Nigeria, media harassment was more sévère, with the government, irritated about for-
eign reporting, prohibiting local radio and télévision from relaying live transmission of
news broadcasts from foreign stations. A magazine critical of the president faced the
confiscation of its computers and copies of its publication, in addition to brief détentions
of some of its journalists and the besieging of its offices by security agents.
Endémie corruption again elicited government campaigns throughout the sub-region,
but generally without making headway in combating this widespread phenomenon.
Nevertheless, Gambia, a small country, witnessed court cases against and dismissals of sev-
eral high-ranking officials as part of a government-run campaign dubbed 'Operation No
Compromise', though neither the president nor MPs were forced to testify in the courts.
These cases went further than government action in Mali and Nigeria, for example. In the
former, a case of embezzlement of ministerial fonds worth CFAfr 2.6 bn led to few concrete
moves, while in Nigeria - predictably, again judged by Transparency International to be one
of the most corrupt countries in thé world - not a single prominent figure was sentenced,
despite 500 people being held in custody in various corruption cases. Racketeering by
police in Benin led to a blockade in September by lorry drivers protesting against thé extor-
tions. As in Nigeria, judicial corruption presented spécial problems, leading to a court case
against some 100 magistrates on charges of embezzlement. The judiciary in Benin was,
moreover, embroiled in a dispute with thé executive over the latter's interférence in thé judi-
cial realm, a dispute that resulted in a magistrates' strike on 9-11 June.
Reports by thé 'Fédération interationale des Droits de l'Homme', criticising thé practices
of thé justice System in both Bénin and Togo, were flatly rejected by both governments. In
both cases, thé charges involved thé use of torture and extra-judicial killings, thé latter
phenomenon also being on thé rise in Nigeria. In Togo, however, there was a slight
improvement in thé général human rights situation as a resuit of foreign pressure, with polit-
l'ical prisoners (but also ordinary criminals) receiving a presidential pardon ( 17 August). In
Sierra Leone, two of three major trials began in a spécial UN-assisted court against some
BjÖf the perpetrators of the worst human rights violations during thé civil war, including the
former rebel RUF. The court also wished to try Charles Taylor, thé former Liberian leader
l
|ow living in exile in Nigeria, who was heavily involved in the Sierra Leonean war.
ïowever, the Liberian government did not back this initiative.
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Coopération and Conflict: Sub-Regional Dimensions
The principal issue in régional coopération was the war in Côte d'Ivoire. The most impor-
tant development from a sub-regional perspective was the décision by the UN Security
Council to deploy a peacekeeping force, UNOCI, totalling over 6,000 troops. While this
décision couldbe interpreted as flowing logically from the Linas-Marcoussis truce, to a con-
sidérable extent it symbolised the inability of sub-regional actors to end the deadlock in the
Ivorian conflict. UNOCI troops joined the separate French 'Licorne' force (4,000 men). The
troops provided by ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) were integrated with
the UNOCI force. The ECOMICI force consisted of contingents from Senegal, Niger, Togo,
Benin, Mali and Ghana and initially totalled some l ,200 men who had been ordered to mon-
itor the ceasefire. This mandate was later extended to ensure respect for the ceasefire and
protection of civilians. For this purpose, ECOWAS decided to provide an additional 2,000
men. With ECOMICI's intégration into UNOCI, it was decided the force would be joined
by troops from Angola, Chad and Bangladesh.
Despite growing UN involvement, ECOWAS continued to try to résolve the crisis, with
the ECOWAS chairman, President John Kufuor of Ghana, vainly attempting on several
occasions to bring the warring sides closer together. Thus, a mini-summit of ECOWAS
leaders was convened in Abuja on 20 June at which heads of state from Nigeria, Ghana,
Togo and Niger, in addition to the president of Gabon, pressured President Gbagbo to work
towards a breakthrough. The talks were described 'frank', and Gbagbo agreed to get in
touch with his independent Prime Minister Seydou Diarra. The ECOWAS médiation and
security council, at its 12th ministerial meeting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa,
lauded the outcome of the mini-summit, even though it led to few concrete results. Then,
an extraordinary ECOWAS summit was convened in the Ghanaian capital Accra on 29-30
July, at which all Ivorian parties met with ECOWAS leaders, the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan and the présidents of Gabon and South Africa. The conference, dubbed Accra
III, confirmed the objectives of Linas-Marcoussis but again failed to achieve a break-
through. On 4 November, President Obasanjo, chairman of the AU Assembly, convened an
emergency summit in Abuja in response to the aerial bombardment of French troops.
After Gbagbo's représentative walking out in anger, West African leaders concurred with
a UN arms embargo, in effect underlining not only the isolation of the Ivorian regime but
also the inability of continental and sub-regional organisations to résolve the crisis.
Thousands of Ivorians, meanwhile, fled across the border into Liberia.
Although there was little coordination among existing peacekeeping missions in these
countries (including Sierra Leone), Ghana managed to secure a deal with Liberia and
UNHCR on the voluntary repatriation of 42,000 Liberian refugees. Guinea and Liberia also
improved their relations in the wake of the 2003 peace agreement in Liberia, despite the
fighting in N'Zérékoré, southeastern Guinea, involving Guinean security forces and,
among others, Liberian ex-combatants. Ties between Guinea and Sierra Leone also
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improved, although here, too, security issues impinged on diplomatic relations. Guinean
troops continued their occupation of the small border town of Yenga, inside Sierra Leone,
not in order to press a claim but because of security considérations. The Yenga issue was
discussed by Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia at the summit of the Mano River Union in
Conakry (l 8-20 May), which also focused on wider issues of border security among the
three neighbours. Relations between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina continued to be ham-
strung by the Ivorian conflict and by alleged Burkinabé involvement. In June-July, Burkina
complained of the continued maltreatment of Burkinabé migrants in Côte d'Ivoire (350,000
of whom had returned home in the course of the civil war), in addition to alleged airspace
violations by Ivorian aircraft. The latter charge was given little credence by European diplo-
mats, but showed that relations between the two countries continued at an all-time low.
Elsewhere in thé sub-region, resolution of the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over
sovereignty of thé Bakassi peninsula (awarded by thé International Court of Justice to
Cameroon) made little progress. Although thé Nigérians agreed to withdraw their troops,
they backtracked at thé last moment, asking for a postponement. With most Bakassi inhab-
itants in favour of union with Nigeria, Nigérian politicians opposed withdrawal, claiming
that this required a change to thé constitution and a UN-supervised referendum on thé
peninsula. This stood in marked contrast to thé ease with which both countries had
exchanged a couple of villages along their common border thé previous year.
ECOWAS also mediated thé political conflict in Guinea-Bissau in the wake of the par-
liamentary élections of 28-30 March. An ECOWAS fact-finding mission, involving
among others thé organisation's Executive Secretary Ibn Chambas, managed to persuade
ail political parties to abide by thé électoral outcome, thus contributing vitally to thé suc-
cessful conclusion of the country's transition process.
General ECOWAS policy on defence and security went a step further with a one-day
summit in January at which it was agreed to introducé a peace fund to meet the financial
requirements of ECOWAS peacekeeping undertakings. Its initial seed money was $ 5 m.
Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal made their contributions and other member states, as well
as donors, were expected to follow suit. With some 1,400 troops in Côte d'Ivoire at the time
and some 3,000 troops forming part of thé UN peacekeeping mission in Libéria (UNMIL),
thé organisation searched for ways to put its military interventions on a more solid footing.
The prolifération of small arms and light weapons again caught thé organisation's attention,
and a conférence in Abuja (22-24 March) sought ways to reinforce thé ECOWAS
Moratorium on thé Exportation, Importation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West
Africa (1999). The small arms unit inside thé executive secrétariat in Abuja was charged
with coordinating initiatives on small arms with other international organisations, includ-
ing thé UN, SADC and several NGOs. So far, 13 of 15 member states hâve established
national commissions to exécute and monitor the moratorium's provisions. The UN
Security Council pledged, at a spécial session held on 25 March, to support thé organisa-
tion in its efforts to tackle the problems of arms trafficking, in addition to related issues such
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as child soldiers and mercenaries. Atop-level meeting between ECOWAS and the United
Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) was held in Abuja on 31 May in a bid to
strengthen coopération in the field of peace and security, and resulted in a memorandum of
understanding to promote sub-regional democracy, good governance, peace and stabiliry
and improve ECOWAS capacities in conflict prevention. This was also the subject of a
workshop in Ghana on early warning within the ECOWAS system, which recommended
the improvement of communications equipment and analytical capacity in the organisa-
tion's four zonal bureaux for conflict prevention (in Banjul, Monrovia, Ouagadougou and
Cotonou).
In more traditional vein, the ECOWAS defence and security commission sought to
enhance the organisation's peacekeeping capacities by agreeing, at a meeting in Abuja on
17-18 June, to establish a standby unit of 6,500 highly trained and equipped soldiers as part
of a rapid reaction force. The standby unit would comprise l ,500 soldiers to be known as
the ECOWAS task force, to be possibly boosted by another 3,500 troops to form a brigade,
with the remaining 1,500 constituting the reserve force. It was planned that the task force
would be déployable within 30 days, while the brigade would be deployed and be self-sus-
taining within 90 days. The brigade would be made up of soldiers from pre-determined
units. The ECOWAS executive secrétariat would define funding needs, operational proce-
dures and requirements, including for the logistics depots in Mali and Sierra Leone. This
development was in conformity with the policy of the AU, which on 20-21 January
adopted a plan for an African Standby Force (ASF; see the genera! chapter) made up of sub-
regional brigades. However, it also followed on the décision of the ECOWAS defence and
security commission to have member states pledge army units to constitute a permanent
ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group), as envisaged in the ECOWAS
Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security. Since this décision had been taken back in My 2000, the current
development also pointed to a lack of genuine progress in this area. Moreover, without
financial and logistical support from Western donors, it would be difficult to get the sub-
regional brigade up and running, this being quite apart from member states' caution about
establishing sub-regional military bodies that could impinge on the security of their
regimes. In this respect, the Canadian government pledged Canadian $ 4.5 m to ECOWAS
for its peace fund, among other things.
Coordination of AU and ECOWAS policy was facilitated by the élection of Nigena's
President Obasanjo as this year's AU chairman. Ghana's president and ECOWAS chair-
man John Kufuor has so far maintained good relations with his Nigérian colleague.
However, in practice, Obasanjo devoted a lot of time to the Darfur crisis rather than purely
West African issues.
Other forms of sub-regional coopération included the signing of a genera! coopération
agreement between ECOWAS and the smaller Francophone 'Union Economique et
Monétaire Ouest Africaine' (UEMOA) headquartered in Ougadougou. The agreement
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should help to prevent duplication of effort in relation to économie intégration, an outcome
made more désirable by plans by Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea to
establish a second monetary zone in West Africa, with a common currency to be called the
'eco', in addition to the West African CFA zone operating under the auspices of UEMOA.
Socioeconomic Developments
The décision to establish this second monetary zone in the sub-region had been taken in
2000. At a conference among Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone held in
Conakry on 3 September, it was observed that fulfilment of the required convergence cri-
teria left much to be desired. While the summit agreed that the West African supervisory
financial authority would be located in Nigeria and the monetary zone's secrétariat in
Guinea (with the interim precursor of the projected bank to work from Ghana), the stated
objective to inaugurate the monetary union by July 2005 appeared illusory. In reality, it was
UEMOA that was, according to the IMF, the furthest along the path to sub-regional inté-
gration, with its common currency tied to the euro and, since 2000, a customs union and a
common external tariff. Thus, the two monetary unions, projected and real, pointed again
to the lack of economie intégration at the level of ECOWAS as a whole. Moreover, these
organisational initiatives ignored the difficulties inherent in integrating non-complemen-
tary économies that are tied into an uneven dependency relationship with the global econ-
omy and disregarded the cross-border traffic taking place in the sub-region's substantial
informal sectors. Thus, ECOWAS leaders in July - as a sign of lack of progress - again
pledged their commitment to the ECOWAS trade libéralisation scheme, reaffirmed imple-
mentation of the programme on the free movement of goods, services and persons (the last
issue made acute by the flight of economie migrants from Côte d'Ivoire) and promised to
work towards the removal of all non-tariif barriers.
NEPAD, it was hoped, could make economie coopération more tangible. On 20 Maren,
ECOWAS leaders met with the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, in Accra
to review the intégration process and the Implementation of the NEPAD agenda. An
Accra Short-term Plan of Action was adopted that would focus on three principal con-
cerns, i.e., establishment of an ECOWAS-wide free trade area and customs zone by 2007,
along with improved market access for West African exports; NEPAD-encouraged infra-
structural projects in the areas of energy, transport and communication; and peace and secu-
rity measures. The World Bank earmarked $ 450 m for such sub-regional projects, part of
which would be spent in the ECOWAS sub-region. The bank also formed a joint task force
with ECOWAS to monitor implementation of the plan of action.
Economie performance ranged widely across the sub-region. The highest real GDP
change, according to the IMF, was registered in Sierra Leone (7.2%) and the lowest (1%)
in Guinea-Bissau, with the sub-regional average around 4.5%. The rise in consumer priées
reached an average of around 4.5%, but with Guinea (Conakry) and Nigeria into doublé
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digits and Ghana and Gambia still hovering around 6%. While one should be cautious about
the reliability of these statistics, it is noteworthy that Côte d'Ivoire still achieved a GDP
growth rate of 1.7%. With the government largely in control of the raw materials and the
infrastructure generally intact, the country remained the main economy in the sub-region's
CFA zone, even though the percentage of people living below the poverty datum line has
increased in recent years from 38% to 44%. Guinea certainly performed worse than m pre-
vious years. Economie performance in neighbouring Gumea-Bissau remained very poor as
well, with one out of three living under the poverty line, despite a relatively favourable ch-
mate and ecology. Nevertheless, this figure was again dwarfed by that of Sierra Leone, agam
last on the Human Development Index (HDI), with 70% of its people living in absolute
poverty. By contrast, Senegal and Ghana had generally good years in socioeconomic terms,
although the former was still rated 157 of 177 countries on the HDI. lts peasant population
was hard lit by a devastatmg locust plague, which also descended on Mauritama (with
nearly half its population under the poverty line, according to UNDP), Mali and Niger. In
the last-mentioned country, the plague led to a record grain déficit that did not bode well
for the coming year. Nigeria, the sub-region's economie superpower, still ranked 151 on the
HDI, a rating that underscores the difficult living conditions faced by most Nigérians. High
petrol priées, however, while hitting many countries in the sub-region hard, increased
Nigeria's income and heightened expectations of a better future in several other (coastal)
states where oil reserves have been found or anticipated (Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire,
Gambia, Liberia). Other good news came from cotton. The WTO rejected US subsidies to
American cotton farmers as distorting international trade - a ruling whose effects on the
sub-region's cotton producers (Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina and Benin, with a total of 10
million people dependent on the erop) was not immediately clear (see the genera! chapter).
HIV/AIDS, while marked by lower infection rates than in other sub-regions (3.5% to
4.5% of adults against a Sub-Saharan total of 7.4%, though on the basis of very tentative
figures), continued its onward march. The fastest rise in absolute numbers occurred m
Nigeria (5% adult prevalence in 13 states), while the highest adult prevalence m percent-
age terms was in Côte d'Ivoire, at 10.7%. Ivorian statistics on this tend to be more rehable
than elsewhere and underscore tiïe relationship between conflict - often including sex-
ual violence and exploitation ~ and HIV/AIDS infection rates. Thus, in récent years thé
infection rate in thé southwestern forest région has generally approached Southern Afhcan
levels.
With rising fuel priées, social conditions were very difficult in many countries, makmg
thé planned acbievement of Millenium Development Goals questionable. High petrol pnces
led to protests in Guinea and Nigeria. Strike action by workers and students protestmg
working conditions or access to educational facilities took place in Mali and Bénin.
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